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Abstract
In this paper, motivated by contradictory evidence on the effect of income on democracy, we
investigate the hypothesis that it is income shocks – major income fluctuations relative to the trend
– rather than marginal year-on-year variation in income levels that lead to non-trivial changes
in the quality of political institutions. Empirical results provide support for this hypothesis, and
show how income inequality plays a crucial role in the effects of economic shocks on democracy.
In particular, negative income shocks reveal a positive effect on democracy in countries with high
inequality, and vice versa.
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I. Introduction
Since Lipset’s famous hypothesis that a sufficiently high level of income
is a prerequisite for democracy (Lipset, 1959), the causal effect of income
on democracy has been a central theme in social science research. While
much of the previous literature found evidence consistent with a positive
effect of income on the quality of democratic institutions (e.g., Barro,
1999), more recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) suggests that
the positive association between income and democracy disappears if one
accounts for systematic differences across countries that affect income
and democracy. In particular, they find no significant effect of income on
democracy in cross-country panel regressions with country-fixed and time-
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fixed effects. This result has initiated an ongoing debate about the role of
income in democracy, with some studies finding evidence for a positive
effect based on non-linear estimators or refined methods, others finding
substantial heterogeneity in the effect of income, and still others providing
evidence for significant improvements in democratic institutions in response
to negative income dynamics or shocks. To date, there has been no coherent
explanation offered for this apparently contradictory evidence on the effect
of income on democracy.
In this paper, we test two hypotheses that imply a more subtle perception
of the income-democracy nexus than considered previously. The first
hypothesis is that it is income shocks – rather than minor fluctuations in
income – that trigger major changes in institutional quality, as reflected by
transitions from autocracy to democracy. The second hypothesis is that the
effect of income shocks on democratization depends crucially on the social
environment, as reflected by economic inequality. Both hypotheses are
motivated by the theoretical literature on democratization, which considered
– broadly speaking – two scenarios for democratization to occur. In the first
scenario, the threat of revolution forces the elite to extend the franchise as
a last means of staying in power for lack of other credible concessions
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2005). In the second scenario, the
elite drives transitions to democracy in exchange for economic benefits
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).1 In both scenarios, negative economic shocks
provide opportunities for democratization because they make revolutions
more likely by shifting the opportunity costs for revolts and by weakening
the elites, or by increasing the incentives to concede political power in
exchange for economic benefits.
In light of this discussion, an appropriate empirical analysis of the
income-democracy nexus should focus on negative economic shocks
and non-marginal changes in democratic quality, instead of exploiting
continuous and symmetric variation in income and institutional quality.
In addition, the consequences of negative economic shocks crucially
depend on inequality in both democratization scenarios. On the one
hand, inequality determines the inherent distributional conflict between
the elite, which wants to stay in power and avoid redistribution, and
the disenfranchised population, which aims to gain political power over
taxation and redistribution. If inequality is high, a negative income shock
weakens the elite and increases the disenfranchised population’s willingness
to revolt because of fiercer distributive conflict.2 On the other hand,
inequality implicitly determines which section of society bears the main
1See Cervellati et al. (2014a) and Cervellati and Sunde (2014) for a unified theory of different
transition scenarios and their implications for subsequent development.
2This argument was made by Lipset (1959, p. 83), who attributed it to De Tocqueville (1835).
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consequences of negative economic shocks. With high inequality, the costs
of severe downturns are disproportionately borne by the elite. Hence, the
elite might be more willing in relative terms to concede political power
and overcome autocratic institutions in response to economic shocks in
an environment with high inequality. In sum, this discussion implies two
testable implications that follow from both strands of the literature on
democratization: (i) major fluctuations in income – in particular negative
income shocks – affect the likelihood of democratization, and (ii) the
prevailing inequality crucially affects the effect of income shocks on
democratization.3
Our empirical results provide support for both hypotheses and document
that negative economic shocks – instead of marginal income fluctuations
or positive income shocks – play a significant role in major changes in
institutions. Our findings further show that the effect of negative income
shocks depends on the level of inequality. In particular, negative income
shocks reveal a positive effect on democracy in countries with high
economic inequality and a negative effect in countries with low inequality.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the income-
democracy nexus, which finds mixed and seemingly contradictory evidence.
In response to the analysis by Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009), several studies
find a positive effect of income on democracy using non-linear estimators
(Benhabib et al., 2013; Che et al., 2013; Heid et al., 2012), data over
longer time horizons (Boix, 2011), or historical event studies of ballot
reforms (Aidt and Jensen, 2017). At the same time, papers analyzing the
effect of exogenous income shocks find both positive and negative effects
on democratic quality. For example, Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008)
document pronounced negative income dynamics before democratization,
and Aidt and Franck (2015) show that poverty-related riots led to democratic
improvements in 19th-century England. Similarly, Brückner and Ciccone
(2011) find that negative income shocks provided a window of opportunity
for democratic improvements in Africa, whereas the absence of transitory
negative income shocks was a factor that contributed to the consolidation of
democracy in 19th-century France (Franck, 2016). Furthermore, evidence
by Chaney (2013) documents the role of economic fluctuations in political
revolts in ancient Egypt, Aidt and Jensen (2014) suggest that franchise
extensions were the result of revolutionary threats in 19th- and 20th-century
Europe, and Aidt and Leon (2016) show that drought-induced riots led to
democratic concessions by incumbent elites in Africa. In contrast, Brückner
3Note that the theoretical prediction refers to a monotonic effect in the interaction between
inequality and income shocks, but not to the effect of inequality per se, which has been conjectured
to be non-monotonic (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005) and which is more difficult to address from
an empirical perspective, as discussed below.
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et al. (2012) find that positive income shocks due to rising oil prices had a
positive effect on democratic quality in countries that are net oil exporters.
Our finding that negative income shocks exert a positive effect on
democratization complements this literature and reconciles earlier results
for positive effects of income on democracy with evidence that negative
income shocks have a positive effect on democratic improvements. We
document the important role of substantial negative income fluctuations
as the trigger for major changes in democratic institutions and a significant
asymmetry in interaction with economic inequality. While this finding
supports the theoretical implications noted above, it is not inconsistent
with the positive effect of long-run economic development in facilitating
the establishment of democracy as implied by Lipset (1959); however,
the empirical identification of the effect of long-run improvements in
economic development goes beyond the scope of analysis in this paper. Our
findings complement recent evidence suggesting that income reveals vastly
heterogeneous effects on democratic institutions across low- and high-
income countries (Moral-Benito and Bartolucci, 2012) and with respect
to colonial history (Cervellati et al., 2014b). By considering the role of
modernization for different scenarios of democratization, our paper also
complements evidence by Przeworski (2009) on the mechanisms behind
franchise extensions to women.
This study most closely relates to work by Dorsch and Maarek
(2014a,b), who explore whether episodes of democratization can be
explained by variation in income inequality and investigate whether the
effect of inequality is heterogeneous across the business cycle. Despite a
similar focus on the interrelation of economic slumps and inequality, our
paper differs from their work conceptually and empirically. Conceptually,
our focus on economic shocks and their interaction with inequality is rooted
in the theoretical literature, which has considered (negative) economic
shocks as the main drivers of democratization, whereas inequality represents
the underlying tension that magnifies or moderates the effects of these
shocks. In contrast to the effect of income shocks, the effect of inequality
is theoretically ambiguous (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Empirically,
our analysis requires exogeneity of income shocks for the identification of
the effects of interest. This is a less demanding assumption than exogeneity
of inequality, which moreover varies much less over time. Our findings
indicate that regular business cycles do not have a systematic effect on
democratization. Instead, large recessions do affect democratic institutions
in interaction with inequality.
Our evidence also provides novel insights about the mechanism
underlying the results, which point to social unrest as an indicator for
the threat of revolution. Economic shocks and inequality exert a greater
effect on the likelihood of peaceful democratic transitions than of violent
C© 2019 The Authors. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Föreningen
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ones. At the same time, negative economic shocks are more likely to trigger
riots if inequality is high. This evidence is in accordance with theoretical
results derived from the first scenario of democratic transitions under the
threat of revolution, where the elite concedes some political power to
avoid a revolution if it is confronted with a credible threat, as reflected by
revolts and riots. Finally, our empirical analysis also considers demographic
pressure as another determinant of democratic transitions, thereby relating
the results to demographic dynamics (e.g., Wilson and Dyson, 2017).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we
present the empirical approach, data sources, and variable construction. In
Section III, we present the main results and provide a brief discussion of
robustness and additional findings. We conclude in Section IV.
II. Empirical Framework and Data
Empirical Framework
To test our hypotheses, the empirical framework focuses on identifying the
effect of major income fluctuations on the quality of political institutions
in interaction with inequality. The estimation framework exploits within-
country variation over time in a dynamic linear panel model.4 However,
when investigating the effect of income shocks on major changes in
institutional quality reflecting democratization, the use of year-on-year
variation does not seem entirely appropriate, as it might be some time
until the shocks fully materialize and the resulting mechanisms lead
to perceptible institutional change. The empirical framework therefore
considers the possibility of a democratic transition between years t and
t + k as the result of an income shock during the previous m years,
as shown in Figure 1. This timing structure rules out feedback from
democratization on income shocks by avoiding overlap between income
shocks and democratization.
Accordingly, the estimation equation is given by
di,t+k = αsi,(t−m,t) + βxi,t + γ[si,(t−m,t) · xi,t ] + w
′
i,tδ + ζi + ηt+k + εi,t+k, (1)
in which di,t+k either denotes a continuous measure of democratic quality
in country i and year t+k or a binary measure of democratization reflecting
major changes in democratic quality in country i between the years t and
t + k; si,(t−m,t) indicates whether an income shock occurred during the
time period t − m and t; xi,t denotes inequality; and wi,t is a vector of
controls that includes the quality of democratic institutions, the level of
4Similar specifications were used by Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Murtin and Wacziarg (2014).
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Yearst − m · · · t · · · t + k
Democratization
Income shock
Fig. 1. Timing of shocks and democratization
income per capita, and education in period t. In the first step, our analysis
considers marginal changes in income and democratic quality (k = 1 and
m = 0) paralleling the set-up in earlier empirical literature using annual
panel data. In the next step, our analysis considers major income shocks for
the extended time window (t−2, t) so as to allow these shocks to affect the
political institutions within a fairly short period of time (k = 1 and m = 2).
In the final step, our baseline model considers changes in democratic quality
over the extended time window (t, t + 3) so as to capture major changes
in democratic institutions (k = 3 and m = 2). The specification includes
country-fixed and time-fixed effects, ζi and ηt+k . In light of our hypotheses,
the coefficients of interest are α and γ.
We remove the country-fixed effects using the “within” transformation.
As our analysis exploits a yearly panel from 1960 to 2014 with a maximum
number of 54 time periods, the time dimension T is sufficiently large that
the Nickell (1981) bias is of little concern for the identification of the
coefficients of interest (Judson and Owen, 1999).
Identification of α and γ requires exogeneity of our measure of
(negative) income shocks. We define them as cyclical fluctuations in income
per capita. Unlike long-run growth trends, these fluctuations are arguably
largely unforeseen by individual agents. For this purpose, we apply the
Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) to disentangle
random cyclical fluctuations from long-run trends in economic development.
In the final subsection of Section II, we discuss the construction of our
shock indicator and alternative specifications in greater detail. Under the
assumption that income shocks are plausibly exogenous, their direct effect
α and their interaction with income inequality γ are estimated consistently,
even if the exogeneity assumption does not hold for inequality (Bun and
Harrison, 2019).5
5As one of the ways to postpone or even avoid democratization is to increase redistribution through
taxation or price distortions, and as inequality only varies slowly, the exogeneity assumption for
inequality, unlike for income fluctuations, is likely to be violated.
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Data Sources
There is an ongoing debate about the appropriate measurement of
institutional quality. Specifically, this debate refers to the information on
which indices of institutional quality are based, as well as their measurement
on a discrete or continuous scale. While continuous measurements conform
more to the slowly changing nature of institutions described by North
(1990), dichotomous measures provide a clearer distinction of the bi-
modal distribution of political institutions as reflected in the democratization
literature, but also as observed in practice (Cheibub et al., 2010). As there is
no consensus regarding this question, we report results for both continuous
and dichotomous measures from different sources. In particular, we
use the composite PolityIV index by Marshall et al. (2013), a composite
indicator based on the Freedom House (2014) Political Rights and Civil
Liberties measures, and the binary Democracy–Dictatorship index by
Cheibub et al. (2010). For comparability, we normalize all measures of
democratic quality to a range from zero (full autocracy) to one (full
democracy).6 Following recent suggestions by Voigt (2013), we additionally
construct an artificial indicator based on the principal components of the
PolityIV, Freedom House, and Democracy–Dictatorship indicators. This
composite index isolates and extracts the common variation among all three
measures and combines them into a single indicator that can be interpreted
as democratic institutions.7
Data for (log) income per capita are taken from the Penn World Tables
by Feenstra et al. (2015). We proxy income inequality with market (pre-
tax, pre-transfer) Gini coefficients from the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID) by Solt (2009, 2016). These data provide
standardized Gini coefficients that are comparable across countries and time,
and which appear to be the best available data for the purpose of this
paper.8 We normalize the Gini coefficients to vary between zero (maximum
6The PolityIV and composite Freedom House indices both constitute broad measures of
institutional quality comprising features of not just the political but also the economic domain.
Both dimensions are in practice highly correlated but not necessarily identical, as pointed out
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Kotschy and Sunde (2017). We presume that democratic
transitions aim to improve institutional quality compared to the previous regime. Hence, we
choose rather broad measures of institutional quality to capture all facets of these transitions.
7Factor analysis synthesizes the variation contained in several variables into common, orthogonal
factors, or principal components. In this way one can decompose the variation in institutional
variables that corresponds more closely to democratic institutions from variation that corresponds
more closely to other institutional dimensions, such as those affecting the economic domain.
Hence, this artificial index corresponds to a narrower measure of democratic quality compared
to its source indicators. For a detailed discussion, see Voigt (2013, pp. 20–21).
8In particular, the SWIID uses imputation procedures to construct a comprehensive set of
inequality estimates over time, with the numerous Gini data points varying with respect to their
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equality) and one (maximum inequality). Moreover, we control for human
capital differences using data on average years of schooling from Barro and
Lee (2013).
For additional analyses in the final subsection of Section III, we
construct economic shocks based on alternative data sources. We use
inflation rates obtained from the World Bank (2017) and data on sovereign
defaults from Enderlein et al. (2012) and Trebesch and Zabel (2017). To
examine the underlying mechanism of democratization, we furthermore use
information on riots from Banks and Wilson (2013) and we distinguish
between peaceful and violent democratization using the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset by Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Allansson et al.
(2017). Finally, we measure demographic pressure based on data for age
composition obtained from the United Nations (2017).
Economic Shocks and Binary Democracy Indicators
Our investigation focuses on the consequences of major income fluctuations
– as opposed to marginal year-on-year variation – on major changes in
democratic institutions. Likewise, we follow most theoretical models that
consider dichotomous institutional regimes – democracy and autocracy –
and use a dichotomous measure of political institutions rather than multi-
valued indices or continuous measures.
We construct a binary indicator for income shocks that takes a value of
one if there is a negative cyclical fluctuation that is larger than or equal to 5
percent relative to the income trend. Negative cyclical shocks of more than
5 percent are sizable. Even during the Great Recession and its aftermath,
most Western countries did not experience shocks of more than 2 or 3
percent of income per capita. For example, in Greece, a country that was
hit especially hard by the recession and the subsequent Euro Crisis, the
largest shock amounted to a value of −5.33 percent in 2011. Consequently,
such events are rare and occur in less than 5 percent of the country–
year observations in our data. A large number of these shocks occurred in
low- and middle-income countries. Because they impose a sizable strain on
incomes and the political discourse within countries for some considerable
time, we allow our income shocks to take a value of one up to m = 2 years
after the shock occurred. Thus, when considering a democratic transition
that begins in period t, the income shock si,(t−m,t) is coded to take a value
of one if a cyclical shock occurred in either one of the years t−2, t−1, or t,
and zero otherwise. Overall, the income shocks measured in this way take
(un)certainty. According to Solt, “those pursuing research on income inequality across many
countries and over time [...] will often find that the SWIID is their best choice of data source”
(Solt, 2015, p. 690).
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a value of one in 12 percent of the country–year observations. Choosing a
longer window (m > 2) for income shocks to affect democratic institutions
results in a larger number of shock observations and, correspondingly, a
noisier measure. In contrast, choosing a shorter window (m < 2) results
in fewer but more concentrated effects of income shocks on democratic
institutions. At the same time, a shorter window is more likely to miss
negative shocks that reveal their full effects only after several years. In the
robustness analysis, we present results for alternative window lengths m.
We apply the HP filter to decompose the income per capita time series
into a trend and a cyclical component. This requires setting a smoothing
parameter that determines the smoothness of the trend component of
the filtered series and thus the variability of the cyclical fluctuations. A
lower smoothing parameter produces smaller cyclical fluctuations and thus
stronger changes in the long-run trend, and vice versa. Following the rule
suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we set the filter’s smoothing parameter
to λ = 6.25 in the baseline analysis.
In a recent contribution, Hamilton (2018) criticized the use of the HP
filter. He showed that, under the usual assumptions made when calculating
the HP filter, the decomposition produces a cyclical component that is
unpredictable from past income dynamics. This randomness of the cyclical
component is undesirable in the standard context, in which researchers want
to discern particular dynamics of the cyclical component for economic
analysis. In contrast, this randomness of the cyclical component is
useful in our context, as it provides us with the exogenous variation
for income shocks that is needed to identify the effect of interest. In
addition, Hamilton mentions several drawbacks of the HP filter. Various
robustness checks address his criticism and confirm the main findings
throughout.
We construct a binary measure of changes in democratic quality to
capture major changes in democratic institutions. This “democratization”
indicator takes a value of one if the change in the normalized democratic
quality between the years t and t + k (where k = 3) exceeds a certain
threshold. We account for disparities in variation among the different
indicators of democratic quality by setting these thresholds to 0.5 for
the PolityIV index, 0.3 for the Freedom House indicator, and 0.4 for the
artificial principal components indicator. Our coding generates a similar
number of roughly 80 democratic transitions across the three continuous
democracy indices. By construction, democratization takes a value of one
if the dichotomous Democracy–Dictatorship index changes from zero to
one. Because the dependent variable is binary, the empirical framework
corresponds to a linear probability model that estimates the likelihood
of democratization conditional on economic shocks and inequality. In the
robustness section, we explore the sensitivity of our findings with respect to
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alternative choices of k and alternative thresholds for the democratization
indicators.
In the baseline specification, income shocks occur before the
democratization process starts. Conceptually, the income shocks might
overlap with the switch from autocracy to democracy. In such a
case, however, the income shock might be endogenous because the
democratization process might feedback to economic performance. The
baseline coding therefore represents a cleaner but also more conservative
view on the effects of income shocks and inequality on democratization.
Nevertheless, we also report results for income shocks that overlap with
democratization in the robustness analysis.
In summary, the empirical analysis uses yearly unbalanced panel data of
130 countries for the period 1960–2014 with more than 3,000 country–year
observations.9
III. Empirical Results
Income, Income Shocks, Inequality, and Democracy
Income and Income Shocks. As a first step, we replicate the standard
specification in the related literature.10 We use annual observations of
a democracy index as the dependent variable and those of income per
capita as the main regressor. We additionally include income inequality
and its interaction with income. Panel A of Table 1 presents the results,
which reproduce the analysis of Acemoglu et al. (2008) extended to the
consideration of economic inequality and its interaction with income. The
results confirm their main finding: that income does not affect democracy
once country-fixed effects are accounted for. Moreover, the estimates
provide no evidence for an interaction between income and inequality in
shaping democratic institutions. The estimated coefficients of income and
the interaction term do not significantly differ from zero.11
In the next step, we go beyond estimating the effect of marginal changes
in income levels, and instead investigate the effects of substantial negative
economic shocks. The dependent variable remains an index of democratic
quality. Panel B of Table 1 presents the results. A negative cyclical income
shock reveals a significant, negative direct effect on democratic quality.
9Table A1 in the Online Appendix presents descriptive statistics of the data.
10The replication data and code are available on the Harvard Dataverse at
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XF1QC7.
11Figure A1 in the Online Appendix illustrates this finding by comparing the (collapsed)
unconditional variation between log gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the PolityIV
index with the residuals of both variables after partialling out country-fixed and time-fixed effects.
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Table 1. Income, inequality, and democracy
Democratic institutions in t + 1 are measured by:
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy– Principal
index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Acemoglu et al. (2008) with inequality interaction
Democratic Qualityt 0.86∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Incomet 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Inequalityt 0.42 0.19 −0.45 0.25
(0.50) (0.35) (1.01) (0.51)
(Incomet ·Inequalityt ) −0.06 −0.02 0.01 −0.04
(0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 128 133 131 125
Observations 3,898 3,794 3,307 3,026
R2 0.82 0.78 0.71 0.79
Panel B: Negative cyclical income shocks and inequality
Democratic Qualityt 0.86∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Shock(t−2, t ) −0.09∗∗∗ −0.05∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Inequalityt −0.11 −0.04 −0.38∗∗ −0.16
(0.08) (0.06) (0.19) (0.11)
(Shock(t−2, t ) ·Inequalityt ) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shocks 492 490 400 382
Countries 128 133 131 125
Observations 3,881 3,782 3,290 3,015
R2 0.82 0.79 0.71 0.79
Notes: All regressions include country-fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and a control for average years of schooling.
The regressions in Panel B additionally control for log income per capita. The shock indicator in Panel B takes a value
of one if there is at least once a negative cyclical shock of at least −5 percent within the time interval (t − 2, t), and
zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01;
∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
According to the estimates in Column 1, the direct effect of a negative
income shock implies a reduction in democratic quality of 0.09 on the
normalized PolityIV index, which ranges from zero to one. However, the
interaction term suggests that the marginal effect of a negative income
shock increases with the level of income inequality. For sufficiently unequal
countries, the income shock thus has a positive effect on democratic
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quality. To exemplify this, the empirical results in Column 1 imply that the
marginal effect of a negative economic shock on democratic quality turns
positive above a threshold value of 0.46 for the Gini coefficient. This value
corresponds to the 60th percentile of the Gini coefficient in the estimation
sample. Hence, the estimated marginal effect of a negative cyclical shock
on democratic quality is positive for approximately 40 percent of the
observations and negative for the remainder. Similar estimates are obtained
for other indices of democratic quality. This result provides a first piece of
evidence that income shocks – rather than minor fluctuations in income –
trigger changes in democratic quality. Lastly, we find no coherent pattern
regarding the main effect of inequality.
Democratic Quality versus Democratization. As a third and final step,
the analysis considers binary democratization indicators instead of index
measures of democratic quality. The following analysis thus considers the
effect of income shocks on major changes in democratic institutions (i.e.,
democratization), as opposed to marginal changes as reflected by an index
measure. Table 2 presents our baseline results for the effects of negative
income shocks and their interaction with inequality on the likelihood of
democratization. Countries with high initial democratic quality are less
likely to undergo a transition from a non-democratic to a democratic
regime. Negative income shocks have a negative direct effect α̂, which
varies between −0.13 and −0.33. A negative income shock thus lowers
the likelihood of democratization by between 13 and 33 percentage points.
The direct effect is moderated by the interaction between income shocks
and inequality. The estimated interaction term γ̂ has a positive sign for all
democratization indicators and varies between 0.31 and 0.68. The estimated
direct effect and the estimated interaction term are both significant at the 5
percent level across all specifications. Furthermore, they are quantitatively
larger than those of the model that uses index measures of democratic
quality.
Hence, the marginal effect of an income shock on the likelihood of
democratization is non-monotonic and can be either positive or negative,
conditional on the level of inequality. The marginal effect can be obtained
by computing
MEshocki,t+3 = α̂ + γ̂ · xi,t . (2)
The estimates in Column 1 of Table 2 therefore imply a positive marginal
effect of a negative income shock on the likelihood of democratization for
Gini values above 0.46 in year t, and a negative marginal effect otherwise.
Figure 2 displays the marginal effect of a negative income shock on the
likelihood of major changes in democratic institutions for all specifications
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Table 2. Negative cyclical income shocks, inequality, and democratization
Indicator for democratization between t and t + 3 based on:
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy– Principal
index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt −0.29∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Shock(t−2, t ) −0.17∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Inequalityt −0.32∗∗ −0.02 −0.82∗∗ −0.54∗∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.33) (0.26)
(Shock(t−2, t ) ·Inequalityt ) 0.37∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transitions 76 81 114 85
Shocks 448 450 349 332
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3,678 3,575 3,036 2,773
R2 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country-fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and controls for log income per capita and
average years of schooling. The dependent variable takes a value of one if there is a major change in democratic
institutions between t and t + 3 that equals or exceeds the respective threshold described in the final subsection of
Section II, and zero otherwise. The shock indicator takes a value of one if there is at least once a negative cyclical
shock of at least −5 percent within the time interval (t − 2, t), and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered on
the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
in Table 2. The solid lines represent the marginal effects, whereas the dashed
lines depict the 95 percent confidence intervals.12 The histogram shows the
distribution of inequality in the different estimation samples. The marginal
effects are significantly positive (negative) at the 5 percent level for a
sufficiently unequal (equal) distribution of incomes. For intermediate levels
of inequality, by contrast, they are quantitatively small and statistically
insignificant.
Our model predicts that negative income shocks will reveal a positive
marginal effect on the likelihood of democratization in roughly 53 percent
of the country–year observations and a negative marginal effect in the
remaining 47 percent. Given the domain of Gini coefficients in year t of
(0.23, 0.68), the estimated marginal effects lie in the interval (−0.17, 0.13)
with a zero effect for intermediate levels of inequality. In the most unequal
12For a large sample, the confidence interval of the marginal effect is (ME ± z1−τ/2 · ŜE) with
ŜE =
√
var(α̂) + x2t · var(γ̂) + 2 · xt · cov(α̂, γ̂) and the critical value z1−τ/2 of a two-sided t-test
of size τ.
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Fig. 2. Effect of a negative income shock on major changes in democratic quality
Notes: The marginal effects of negative income shocks are based on the estimates in Table 2.
society, a negative income shock increases the likelihood of democratization
by 13 percentage points. In contrast, a negative income shock reduces the
likelihood of a substantial change in democratic quality by 17 percentage
points in the most equal society. Finally, in the absence of shocks, inequality
is associated with lower democratic quality.
These findings are in accordance with historical examples. For example,
negative economic shocks preceded democratic reforms such as elections
and the implementation of a multi-party system in several African countries
with high levels of inequality.13 On the opposite spectrum, several countries
with low inequality did not experience major democratic improvements
after negative economic shocks. In some cases, there were even tendencies
toward greater autocracy.14 When interpreting particular historical examples
13Examples are the Central African Republic, Malawi, and Zambia. They were governed
autocratically until around 1990 and had high inequality with Gini values of 0.55 or higher.
Economic shocks during this period led to riots and ultimately the end of their autocratic systems.
14Examples are Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, and Uganda, which all exhibited a Gini value
of around 0.35 during the 1990s. Despite repeated economic shocks, such as recessions or phases
of high inflation, these countries’ democratic institutions did not improve and in some cases even
deteriorated.
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in light of the empirical findings, one should, however, keep in mind
that the estimation results correspond to the average marginal effect of
negative economic shocks on the likelihood of democratization. Hence, they
need not provide an accurate description of each historical event. In Iran,
for example, the realized political institutions do not correspond to the
empirical predictions.15
Positive and Negative Shocks. Up to this point, the analysis has restricted
attention to negative income shocks and confirmed the finding of a non-
monotonic effect of such shocks on the likelihood of democratization
conditional on the extent of inequality. Similarly to the rationale of a
window of opportunity for democratization during economic downturns,
however, positive shocks might dampen support for a switch from autocracy
to democracy during economic upturns and stabilize autocracies. Analogous
to the negative income shocks, we also construct a binary indicator for
positive income shocks. We code a value of one if there is at least once a
positive cyclical shock of at least 5 percent within the time interval (t−2, t),
and zero otherwise. About 15 percent of the country–year observations
qualify as positive income shocks, of which most occur in low- and middle-
income countries.
Table 3 presents the results for a specification with positive and
negative income shocks. Both variables enter the estimation equation
separately in order to account for the possibility of heterogeneous effects
of positive and negative income shocks. Country–year observations that
do not exhibit either type of shock therefore constitute the reference
category. Across all specifications, negative income shocks again exhibit
a negative direct effect on the likelihood of democratization. Moreover,
the interaction term between negative income shocks and inequality is
again positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Notably, the point
estimates for the negative income shock and the interaction term are
quantitatively almost identical to the baseline estimates. Positive income
shocks, in contrast, do not affect the likelihood of democratization:
the results provide evidence for neither a direct effect nor an indirect
effect through the interaction with inequality. In light of this result, we
concentrate only on negative income shocks for the remainder of this
paper.
15By the late 1970s, Iran was characterized by high inequality, as reflected by a Gini value of 0.56
in 1979, and economic shocks arguably contributed to the Shah’s downfall, which, it was widely
believed, would eventually give rise to democracy. Nevertheless, there was no democratization.
Instead, the quality of democratic institutions fluctuated considerably during the 1990s and 2000s,
before the political system stabilized as an autocracy.
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Table 3. Cyclical income shocks, inequality, and democratization
Indicator for democratization between t and t + 3 based on:
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy– Principal
index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt −0.29∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Negative Shock[t−2, t ] −0.17∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Positive Shock[t−2, t ] −0.04 −0.02 −0.10 −0.03
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
Inequalityt −0.33∗∗ −0.01 −0.84∗∗ −0.55∗∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.33) (0.26)
(Negative Shock(t−2, t ) ·Inequalityt ) 0.36∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15)
(Positive Shock(t−2, t ) ·Inequalityt ) 0.12 0.08 0.27 0.11
(0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transitions 76 81 114 85
Negative shocks 448 450 349 332
Positive shocks 534 523 430 394
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3,678 3,575 3,036 2,773
R2 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country-fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and controls for log income per capita and
average years of schooling. The dependent variable takes a value of one if there is a major change in democratic
institutions between t and t + 3 that equals or exceeds the respective threshold described in the final subsection of
Section II, and zero otherwise. The shock indicator takes a value of one if there is at least once a negative/positive
cyclical shock of at least±5 percent within the time interval (t−2, t), and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered
on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
Robustness
This section discusses robustness checks regarding alternative specifications
or modifications in the coding of variables. The corresponding tables are
presented in the Online Appendix.
Accounting for Multiple Imputation. The SWIID uses imputation
procedures to construct a comprehensive set of inequality estimates over
time. As this imputation procedure might understate the uncertainty in the
data, the dataset provides 100 potential realizations of the Gini coefficient
for a given country and year, which allow for a standard error adjustment
as suggested by Solt (2016). Accounting for uncertainty related to multiple
imputation requires a time-consuming procedure in which the analysis is
conducted 100 times for the different potential Gini values. Table A2 in the
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Online Appendix shows that this correction is inessential for the quantitative
and qualitative results of the baseline specification.
Time Window for Income Shocks and Positive Income Shocks. The
construction of the income shock variable requires an assumption about the
time window m, during which the cyclical component is sufficiently large
relative to the trend component. We investigate the robustness of the main
results with respect to the length of this time window for income shocks
and with respect to the construction of binary shock indicators during this
window. Regarding the length, a narrower time window (m < 2) might
allow for more precise timing of the effect, but it might miss the effects of
prolonged economic downturns. Instead, choosing a longer window (m > 2)
results in a larger number of income shocks and thus a noisier measure.
Table A3 in the Online Appendix shows that the results do not change
considerably for different codings of the window length of income shocks
(for example, m = 0 or m = 4). Overall, the estimates qualitatively confirm
our main findings. Income shocks reveal a smaller marginal effect on the
likelihood of democratization if m = 0, whereas the marginal effect is
almost identical to the baseline result if m = 4.
Regarding the construction of the binary indicator, the baseline analysis
uses yearly data but our income shocks combine information over a
sequence of three years to estimate the effect on the likelihood of
democratization during the subsequent three-year time window. A shock in
one year thus triggers a coding of the binary indicator for three consecutive
years. We verified the robustness of our results when ensuring that the
same country–year shock does not appear in more than one observation. To
that end, we collapsed the data into non-overlapping three-year observation
periods (a panel of three-year frequency). The results are quantitatively very
similar, as shown by Table A4 in the Online Appendix.
Finally, sufficiently strong cyclical fluctuations over the time window
(t − 2, t) might generate observations that qualify as both positive and
negative income shocks; in fact, few observations fall into this category. In
order to be fully symmetric and transparent regarding the possibility that
the presence of negative shocks could take up the effect of positive shocks
in the same period, Table A5 in the Online Appendix shows the results
for a specification that restricts attention exclusively to positive shocks
(analogous to the specifications that only consider negative shocks in the
baseline specification). The results confirm that positive income shocks have
no effect on democratization.
Length of Time Window for Changes in Democracy. Ideally, democratization
processes that are triggered by economic shocks should reveal the first
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detectable results within a short time-frame. However, the democratization
process might span over a longer period and require more than one year
to be completed. This is the main reason for considering a three-year
horizon in the baseline specification. Table A6 in the Online Appendix
shows that the empirical results are insensitive to different codings of the
democratization period (for example, k = 1 or k = 5). In particular, the
qualitative patterns in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients are
identical, while the effect sizes appear to be slightly larger when considering
longer time windows.
Sensitivity of the Trend-Cycle Decomposition. The construction of the
variable of income shocks is based on a standard HP decomposition. The
use of the HP filter has recently been criticized by Hamilton (2018) on
theoretical and practical grounds. Hamilton mentions several drawbacks
of the HP filter that relate to the appropriate choice of the smoothing
parameter, to instability close to the start or end of the observation window,
and to autocorrelation in the cyclical component (which is induced by the
HP filter itself as a consequence of the use of future realizations in the
computation of the decomposition). To account for these drawbacks of the
HP filter and to explore the robustness of our results with respect to the
use of the HP filter, we conduct a series of robustness checks.
As the HP decomposition requires an assumption about the smoothing
parameter λ, we explore how the effect of negative income shocks on
democratic institutions varies for different specifications of λ. The results
in Table A7 in the Online Appendix document that income shocks reveal
a stronger effect on the likelihood of democratic transitions for a more
smoothed long-run trend (λ = 1) with fewer shocks, and a weaker effect
for a less smoothed long-run trend (λ = 100) with more shocks. We
also account for potential instability of the cyclical component at the
margins of our sample by omitting these observations from the analysis.
The corresponding results in Table A8 in the Online Appendix confirm the
main findings. Finally, Hamilton (2018) proposes an alternative approach
to constructing income shocks based on the residuals of regressions of
income levels on a constant and lagged values, which does not suffer from
the problem of autocorrelation in the cyclical component induced by the use
of future realizations in the computation of the HP decomposition. Using
this method, we obtain similar results as in the main analysis; see Table A9
in the Online Appendix.
Thresholds for Changes in the Binary Democracy Variable. Constructing a
binary democratization variable requires an assumption about a threshold
for the required change in the normalized democracy index. Table A10 in
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the Online Appendix shows that our findings do not hinge on the difference
in thresholds for the construction of our dichotomous democratization
variable.
Alternative Binary Democracy Measures. As an additional robustness
check, we apply our coding of negative income shocks and democratic
transitions to alternative measures of democratization. First, we replicate the
analysis for the binary democracy variables constructed by Papaioannou and
Siourounis (2008) and the alternative variable suggested by Acemoglu et al.
(2019). Both measures code democratizations based on sizable changes in
the democracy indicators by PolityIV and Freedom House in conjunction
with stability criteria for successful democratic transitions. Table A11
in the Online Appendix shows that applying our coding choices to the
dataset of Acemoglu et al. (2019) yields the same qualitative results,
albeit with quantitatively slightly larger coefficients. The cut-off values
for the Gini coefficient in period t are quantitatively almost identical to
our baseline specification. Thus, the marginal effects are slightly larger in
absolute terms for a given level of inequality. Hence, the main results do
not hinge on coding conventions regarding democratic quality. Moreover,
our baseline results provide a conservative view on the role of income
shocks and their interaction with inequality on the likelihood of democratic
transitions.
Time Overlap between the Occurrence of Shocks and Changes in Democracy.
In our baseline specifications, economic shocks occur before the
democratization process starts. Conceptually, the switch from autocracy
to democracy and economic shocks might also overlap. The baseline
specification thus imposes a timing restriction, which is potentially too
conservative to capture the full effects of economic shocks on the
likelihood of democratization. However, this timing restriction prevents
feedback from democratization to economic shocks that would render the
explanatory variables endogenous. We test the robustness of our results with
respect to this timing restriction by estimating models that allow for the
democratization process and the income shocks to overlap. Specifically, we
continue to measure changes in democratic quality between t and t + 3.
However, the income shocks enter the empirical analysis in either year t+1
or t +2 such that the income shocks and democratic transitions overlap. As
Table A12 in the Online Appendix documents, the estimated interaction
term for income shocks and inequality is larger than in the baseline
specification. Our baseline coding thus presents a rather conservative
view on the marginal effect of income shocks on the likelihood of
democratization.
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Logit Estimates. Even though the linear probability model is preferable
in the context of specifications with interactions, the binary dependent
variable suggests the use of a logit estimator. As Table A13 in the Online
Appendix shows, conditional logit regressions produce similar qualitative
results as the linear probability model. Due to the small number of major
political transitions and income shocks in the sample, however, the logistic
regressions drop a large number of observations for which the estimated
likelihood would diverge to infinity. Therefore, the logit results should be
considered suggestive at best.
Additional Results
This section reports further results with respect to different measures of
economic shocks and sheds light on the mechanisms underlying the main
results.
Inflation Shocks. In our baseline specification, we define economic shocks
as cyclical fluctuations around the long-run growth trend. Another way of
modeling economic shocks is to consider hikes in inflation rates. Many
low-income countries, for example, rely heavily on the export of certain
agricultural products and natural resources. Fluctuations in international
commodity prices might put substantial strain on per capita incomes and
create a window of opportunity for changes in political institutions.16
We construct inflation shocks based on price changes derived from the
GDP deflator. Because countries that catch up economically typically
experience high inflation during the convergence process, we limit our
attention to inflation rates that equal or exceed 20 percent. We follow
our coding of negative income shocks and code an inflation shock if
there is at least once inflation of at least 20 percent within the interval
(t −2, t), and zero otherwise. Approximately 24 percent of the country–year
observations of the dataset can be classified as inflation shocks. Most of
these cases are observed in low- and middle-income countries with strong
persistence regarding the (in-)stability of prices. Due to data availability,
the estimation sample shrinks by between 300 and 400 country–year
observations.
Table 4 reports results for the effect of inflation shocks and their
interaction with inequality on the likelihood of democratization. The point
estimates of the inflation shock and the interaction term have similar
magnitudes as those obtained for negative cyclical shocks in the baseline
16See, for example, Brückner et al. (2012), who exploit oil price shocks to identify changes in
democratic quality.
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Table 4. Inflation shocks, inequality, and democratization
Indicator for democratization between t and t + 3 based on:
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy– Principal
index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt −0.31∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Shock[t−2, t ] −0.18∗∗∗ −0.13∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.17
(0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
Inequalityt −0.35∗ −0.06 −1.00∗∗ −0.57∗
(0.19) (0.15) (0.40) (0.33)
(Shock[t−2, t ] ·Inequalityt ) 0.40∗∗∗ 0.29 0.53∗∗ 0.34
(0.13) (0.18) (0.23) (0.23)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transitions 64 61 94 70
Shocks 715 682 639 606
Countries 123 123 118 118
Observations 3,239 3,132 2,547 2,440
R2 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.14
Notes: All regressions include country-fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and controls for log income per capita and
average years of schooling. The dependent variable takes a value of one if there is a major change in democratic
institutions between t and t + 3 that equals or exceeds the respective threshold described in the final subsection of
Section II, and zero otherwise. The shock indicator takes a value of one if there is at least once inflation of at least
20 percent within the time interval (t − 2, t), and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered on the country level.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
specification. However, due to the considerably larger number of shocks,
the coefficients are less precisely estimated than those obtained for negative
cyclical shocks. The empirical model thus lacks the ability to estimate
an interaction term that is statistically different from zero at conventional
significance levels for the specifications in Columns 2 and 4. Nonetheless,
the results again confirm the non-monotonic effect of economic shocks on
the likelihood of democratization conditional on the degree of inequality.
Given the distribution of Gini coefficients in year t, the marginal effects of
an inflation shock on the likelihood of democratization lie in the interval
(−0.14, 0.10). This range closely conforms to the range of marginal effects
obtained for the baseline model. We interpret this result as another piece of
evidence that shocks to (disposable) income – rather than minor fluctuations
in income levels – trigger major changes in democratic institutions.
Sovereign Defaults. Yet another way of modeling shocks is to consider
financial crises that result in sovereign default. To this end, we use the
data of Enderlein et al. (2012) and Trebesch and Zabel (2017), which
provide information on 25 sovereign defaults in 61 developing and emerging
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market economies between 1980 and 2009. Following the definition of
Standard & Poor’s (2011), these papers classify a country as being in
default if the government misses payments on bonds or loans on due
time or, alternatively, if it announces debt restructuring.17 We adopt their
classification and code a sovereign default indicator, which takes a value of
one if a country fails to repay a part of its debt or announces a restructuring
of its debt at least once within the time interval (t−2, t), and zero otherwise.
The data by Enderlein et al. (2012) and Trebesch and Zabel (2017)
exclude advanced economies, small countries with fewer than one million
inhabitants, countries with insufficient data quality, states that restructured
their debt in the context of state dissolution, and highly indebted poor
countries that have only very limited access to financial markets. We code
our default indicator to take a value of zero for these countries for a
variety of reasons. The advanced economies experienced essentially no
sovereign default during the observation period. For the small and highly
indebted poor countries, we lack data on inequality and income to the point
where they do not enter the estimation sample. Countries that democratize
during the dissolution of larger states enter the sample only after the
completed dissolution, as we lack data from before and during dissolution.
For countries with insufficient data quality, the picture is less clear; however,
our coding represents a lower bound for the number of defaults, which in
case of doubt leads to a less informative measure. Therefore, the default
indicator provides a conservative view on the effect of sovereign defaults on
the likelihood of democratization. In total, roughly 6 percent of the country–
year observations in the data can be classified as sovereign defaults.
Table 5 reports the estimated effects of sovereign defaults and their
interaction with inequality on the likelihood of democratization. The point
estimates are quantitatively similar to the baseline estimates although to
some degree less precise. The findings again confirm the non-monotonic
pattern of economic shocks on the likelihood of democratization conditional
on inequality. Given the distribution of Gini coefficients in year t, the
marginal effects of a default shock on the likelihood of democratization
lie within the interval (−0.15, 0.15). This range again conforms closely to
the range of marginal effects obtained for the baseline model. Interestingly,
sovereign defaults seem to affect democratization independently of negative
cyclical shocks: a model that controls for negative cyclical shocks, sovereign
defaults, and their interactions with inequality delivers quantitatively almost
identical point estimates for cyclical shocks and sovereign defaults.18 We
view this as evidence for different types of economic shocks, which –
17See Trebesch and Zabel (2017, p. 422) and Standard & Poor’s (2011, Online Appendix 1).
18See Table A14 in the Online Appendix.
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Table 5. Sovereign defaults, inequality, and democratization
Indicator for democratization between t and t + 3 based on:
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy– Principal
index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt −0.29∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Defaults(t−2, t ) −0.22∗∗ −0.13∗ −0.30∗∗ −0.17
(0.11) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13)
Inequalityt −0.30∗ −0.03 −0.79∗∗ −0.52∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.32) (0.26)
(Defaults(t−2, t ) ·Inequalityt ) 0.50∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.66∗ 0.38
(0.25) (0.15) (0.34) (0.28)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transitions 76 81 114 85
Sovereign defaults 226 227 225 223
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3,695 3,587 3,053 2,784
R2 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country-fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and controls for log income per capita and
average years of schooling. The dependent variable takes a value of one if there is a major change in democratic
institutions between t and t + 3 that equals or exceeds the respective threshold described in the final subsection of
Section II, and zero otherwise. The sovereign default indicator takes a value of one if a country fails to repay a part
of its debt or announces a restructuring of its debt at least once within the time interval (t − 2, t), and zero otherwise.
Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗p < 0.1.
independently from each other – affect the quality and stability of political
institutions.
Income Trends. The specifications up to this point considered short-
term income shocks together with inequality as the key determinant for
democratization. Long-run growth trends constitute an alternative angle
to approach the definition of economic shocks. A period of prolonged
stagnation or shrinkage presents a potential environment in which the
people could voice their discontent with the existing political institutions.
According to this rationale, we code a negative economic trend indicator,
which takes a value of one if the HP-filtered income per capita series
shrinks by at least 5 percent between years t−3 and t, and zero otherwise.19
19Note that the coding of growth trends refers to changes between years and not shocks within
years. Hence, this coding requires us to include the change between years t − 3 and t − 2 to be
fully symmetric to the shock indicators that refer to the time interval (t − 2, t).
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Table 6. Negative growth trends, inequality, and democratization
Indicator for democratization between t and t + 3 based on:
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy– Principal
index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt −0.29∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Trend[t−3, t ] −0.22∗∗∗ −0.19∗ −0.24∗ −0.25∗∗
(0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Inequalityt −0.32∗∗ −0.02 −0.84∗∗ −0.57∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.33) (0.26)
(Trend[t−3, t ] ·Inequalityt ) 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗ 0.50∗ 0.57∗∗
(0.18) (0.25) (0.29) (0.26)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transitions 76 81 114 85
Trends 256 263 242 237
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3,663 3,561 3,022 2,759
R2 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country-fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and controls for log income per capita and
average years of schooling. The dependent variable takes a value of one if there is a major change in democratic
institutions between t and t + 3 that equals or exceeds the respective threshold described in the final subsection of
Section II, and zero otherwise. The trend indicator takes a value of one if the HP-filtered income per capita series
shrinks by at least 5 percent between t − 3 and t , and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered on the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
Prolonged trends of income shrinkage occur in 7 percent of the country–
year observations, with a strong concentration in low- and middle-income
countries.
Table 6 reports results for the effects of negative growth trends and
their interaction with inequality on the likelihood of democratization. The
estimated coefficients again confirm the finding of a non-monotonic effect
of economic downturns on the likelihood of democratization conditional
on the level of inequality. The point estimates show a similar qualitative
pattern as those obtained for the baseline model. However, the estimated
coefficients for negative growth trends vary less across the different
specifications. The estimated coefficients for negative growth trends and
their interaction with inequality are significant at the 10 percent level
across all specifications, with the most precise estimates being for the
PolityIV index. The marginal effects of a negative growth trend on the
likelihood of democratization are quantitatively similar to the baseline
estimates and lie in the interval (−0.13, 0.14). We acknowledge that it
is much harder (if not impossible) to argue that prolonged stagnation is
unforeseen by the people as compared to the different economic shocks
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described above. Nevertheless, we view these results as another piece of
evidence that highlights the importance of major income fluctuations –
rather than marginal changes in income levels – for major changes in
democratic institutions.
Mechanisms: Democratization Scenario, Riots, and Demography. We close
the empirical analysis by exploring the underlying mechanisms stipulated
by the theoretical literature. Recall that the empirical analysis builds
on the hypotheses that negative income shocks affect the likelihood
of democratization and that this effect is crucially affected by the
prevailing inequality, which follow from the two strands of democratization
models. So, in order to explore the empirical relevance of the different
democratization models, we first investigate the heterogeneity in the
income-democracy nexus depending on the type of democratization.
Specifically, we distinguish between peaceful transitions, during which there
is no or only little armed conflict, and violent transitions, which are
accompanied by significant armed conflict. This distinction is motivated by
theoretical predictions and empirical findings that civil conflict during the
democratization process reveals persistent negative effects on subsequent
institutional quality and economic growth (Cervellati and Sunde, 2014;
Cervellati et al., 2014a).
For the classification of peaceful and violent democratization, we use
(binary) information from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset on
incidences of armed conflict in a given country and year. In this dataset,
an armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least
25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (UCDP/PRIO, 2017, p. 1). We
ignore armed conflicts that involve another state and confine our sample to
internal armed conflicts only. Specifically, we classify a democratization as
violent if during the period of democratization there was violent conflict in
at least one year. If there was no violence in any year, the democratization
is considered non-violent and therefore peaceful.
Table 7 reports results distinguishing between peaceful and violent
transitions to democracy. The specification controls for conflicts over the
past three years and, in order to keep the results comparable across
transitions, we restrict our attention to the subsample of countries that
experienced at least one democratic transition.20 The baseline specification
is extended to account for civil conflicts during past years. Panel A shows
20The results are qualitatively similar for a specification without a control for past conflict or
when considering the full sample: see Tables A15 and A16 in the Online Appendix.
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Table 7. Peaceful and violent democratization
Indicator for democratization between t and t + 3 based on:
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy– Principal
index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Peaceful democratization
Democratic Qualityt −0.30∗∗∗ (0.05) −0.45∗∗∗ (0.07) −0.24∗∗∗ (0.04) −0.37∗∗∗ (0.06)
Past Conflict[t−2, t ] −0.03∗∗ (0.01) −0.07∗∗ (0.03) −0.02 (0.02) −0.05∗∗ (0.02)
Shock[t−2, t ] −0.25∗∗∗ (0.09) −0.34∗∗∗ (0.10) −0.37∗∗∗ (0.11) −0.37∗∗∗ (0.12)
Inequalityt −0.10 (0.31) −0.01 (0.35) −0.93∗ (0.48) −0.68 (0.47)
(Shock[t−2, t ] ·Inequalityt ) 0.54∗∗∗ (0.20) 0.77∗∗∗ (0.22) 0.79∗∗∗ (0.26) 0.77∗∗∗ (0.26)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transitions 52 59 68 56
Shocks 222 197 174 167
Countries 47 56 54 48
Observations 1,473 1,453 1,371 1,096
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18
Panel B: Violent democratization
Democratic Qualityt −0.12∗∗∗ (0.04) −0.11∗∗∗ (0.04) −0.14∗∗∗ (0.03) −0.15∗∗∗ (0.04)
Past Conflict[t−2, t ] 0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Shock[t−2, t ] −0.00 (0.04) 0.06 (0.11) −0.22∗∗ (0.09) −0.12 (0.07)
Inequalityt −0.02 (0.26) 0.02 (0.20) −0.52 (0.37) −0.11 (0.36)
(Shock[t−2, t ] ·Inequalityt ) 0.00 (0.09) −0.13 (0.22) 0.44∗∗ (0.19) 0.23 (0.15)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transitions 24 22 46 29
Shocks 222 197 174 167
Countries 47 56 54 48
Observations 1,473 1,453 1,371 1,096
R2 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.10
Notes: All regressions include country-fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and controls for log income per capita and
average years of schooling. Observations of democratization are split into two categories: non-violent and violent.
In Panel A, the dependent variable takes a value of one if two conditions are met: (i) there is a major change in
democratic institutions between t and t + 3 that equals or exceeds the respective threshold described in the final
subsection of Section II, and (ii) during the period of democratization there is no violent conflict in any year;
otherwise the dependent variable takes a value of zero. In Panel B, the dependent variable takes a value of one if two
conditions are met: (i) there is a major change in democratic institutions between t and t + 3 that equals or exceeds
the respective threshold described in the final subsection of Section II, and (ii) during the period of democratization
there is violent conflict in at least one year; otherwise the dependent variable takes a value of zero. Past conflict takes
a value of one if there is violent political conflict at least once within the time interval (t − 2, t), and zero otherwise.
The shock indicator takes a value of one if there is at least once a negative cyclical shock of at least −5 percent within
the time interval (t − 2, t), and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
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the estimates for peaceful democratic transitions, which account for roughly
two thirds of all democratic transitions in the sample, as the dependent
variable. The estimated coefficient for past conflict has a negative sign
and is statistically significant in most specifications, indicating that past
conflict reduces the likelihood of a peaceful democratization. The point
estimates for economic shocks are significant and negative across all
specifications, whereas the coefficient for the interaction of shocks with
inequality is positive and significant throughout. The results thus confirm
once again a non-monotonic effect of economic shocks on the likelihood
of democratization conditional on inequality, although the point estimates
are in fact slightly larger than for the baseline analysis in Table 2.
Panel B of Table 7 reports the estimates for violent democratic
transitions. With this specification, the estimated coefficients for economic
shocks and their interaction with inequality become insignificant in the
specifications with democratization measured using the simple indices.
When using the Democracy–Dictatorship index or the principal components
for measuring democratization in conjunction with violent events, the results
deliver the same pattern as for the baseline. In particular, the occurrence
of a negative shock reduces the likelihood of democratization, whereas
the shock interacts with income inequality, delivering a positive overall
effect on democratization of shocks when inequality is high. At the same
time, the coefficients are considerably smaller than for the baseline, and the
explanatory power, as measured by the R2, is halved compared to the model
for peaceful democratic transitions. This evidence suggests that peaceful
and violent democratization differ considerably in their determinants. While
economic shocks and inequality are important determinants for peaceful
democratization, their influence is weaker for violent democratic transitions.
This could be due in part to the lower statistical power and in part to
structural differences in the democratization process if violent transitions
to democracy are related to other mechanisms and contingencies.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the results are incompatible
with the strand of models that view democratization as the consequence
of an explicit or implicit conflict, as reflected by a revolution constraint.
According to models in which the elite extends the franchise for lack of
other credible concessions when the revolution constraint binds (as, for
example, in the spirit of Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2005), the
transition will, in fact, be peaceful along the equilibrium path if the elite
succeeds in avoiding open conflict in exchange for democratization.
Another way to test the relevance of the mechanism underlying this
strand of models is to investigate the role of negative income shocks, and
their interaction with inequality, on the likelihood of riots and revolts.
Table 8 presents the estimation results. Negative income shocks reveal a
negative direct effect on the likelihood of riots, which is moderated by
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Table 8. Negative cyclical income shocks, inequality, and riots
Dependent variable is the binary indicator for riots between t and
t + 3.
Democratic quality PolityIV Political Rights Democracy– Principal
proxied by index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt −0.14 −0.26∗ −0.08 −0.21∗
(0.09) (0.14) (0.07) (0.11)
Shock(t−2, t ) −0.76∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗ −0.84∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28)
Inequalityt −0.30 −0.02 −0.26 −0.15
(0.76) (0.71) (0.79) (0.81)
(Shock(t−2, t ) ·Inequalityt ) 1.68∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗
(0.58) (0.59) (0.61) (0.62)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shocks 425 427 421 401
Countries 126 132 132 126
Observations 3,442 3,334 3,407 3,127
R2 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
Notes: All regressions include country-fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and controls for log income per capita and
average years of schooling. The dependent variables takes a value of one if there are riots between at least t and t + 3,
and zero otherwise. The shock indicator takes a value of one if there is at least once a negative cyclical shock of at
least −5 percent within the time interval (t − 2, t), and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered on the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
their positive interaction with inequality. In particular, the higher the level
of inequality, the more likely it is that a negative economic shock will
induce riots. Therefore, the results mirror those for democratization as an
outcome; moreover, they are consistent with the predictions of the literature
on democratization under the shadow of conflict.
We also replicated the analysis using the dataset provided by Geddes et
al. (2014) for alternative codings of democratic transitions from autocracy
and information about riots as dependent variables. The results in Table
A17 in the Online Appendix confirm the earlier results across the different
specifications.
The theoretical literature also suggests that demographics are a possible
driving force behind political transitions. For instance, according to Fuller
(1995, p. 152), economically unequal countries with a relatively large
population share of young individuals “who are in demand of land, jobs,
higher education, opportunity, and other kinds of resources in society”
exhibit a greater likelihood of conflict and struggle for power, and ultimately
of a democratic transition. To explore the relevance of this “youth bulge”
hypothesis in our context, we replicate the analysis with an extended
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specification that also contains the share of individuals aged 15–24 years in
the population as a proxy for demographic pressure and its interaction with
economic inequality to allow for a non-monotonic effect conditional on the
cohesiveness of the society.21 The results, which are shown in Table A18
in the Online Appendix, deliver estimates for the non-monotonic effect of
negative income shocks on the likelihood of democratic transitions that
are quantitatively almost identical to those for the baseline specification.
The likelihood of democratization decreases with the increasing share of
young people. At the same time, the interaction with inequality implies that
in more unequal societies with a Gini coefficient of above 0.45, a youth
bulge increases the likelihood of democratization. However, the coefficient
estimates are not always statistically different from zero. Specifications
in which economic shocks and demographic pressure can also interact
with each other deliver small and insignificant coefficient estimates, which
indicate that economic shocks and demographic pressure seem to affect the
likelihood of democratization separately from each other.22
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have documented novel cross-country panel evidence for a
non-monotonic effect of income on democracy. In particular, the evidence
suggests that focusing on major income shocks – rather than continuous
year-on-year variation in income levels – reveals a significant effect on
democratic quality. Moreover, the results reveal an important asymmetry of
this effect: negative income shocks exhibit a significantly negative effect
on democratic institutions, whereas no comparable countervailing effect is
found for positive income shocks. Additionally, negative income shocks
reveal an important interaction effect with economic inequality: negative
income shocks lead to a deterioration of democratic quality in equal
societies, whereas they entail an improvement in democratic quality in
unequal societies. No such interaction is found for positive income shocks.
This suggests that negative economic shocks might initiate democratic
21This categorization follows Fuller (1995) and represents “the conventional cut-off for youth in
the literature” (Nordås and Davenport, 2013, p. 932).
22Table A19 in the Online Appendix reports results for an empirical model without negative
income shocks. These parsimonious specifications produce parameter estimates for demographic
pressure and its interaction with inequality that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those
reported in Table A18 in the Online Appendix. Extended specifications that account for a triple
interaction term between negative income shocks, demographic pressure, and inequality also do
not deliver significant coefficient estimates, suggesting that both channels operate in isolation;
see Table A20 in the Online Appendix. However, inequality and the youth bulge might themselves
be related phenomena that are hard to disentangle with the present approach using cross-country
panel data. Shedding light on these issues constitutes an interesting avenue for future research.
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movements in an environment with high inequality, which is consistent with
the theoretical mechanisms for democratization discussed in the literature.
By highlighting the role of asymmetric shocks and their interaction with
inequality, the results shed new light on the intricate relation between
income and democracy and on the seemingly contradictory findings in the
literature.
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article. The replication data and code are
available on the Harvard Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XF1QC7.
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